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JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-20').
STANDARD OF REVIEW
All of the issues presented in this appeal involve questions of law concerning
the interpretation of certified court dockets, the interpretation of Utah Statutes, the
interpretation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the interpretation of
unambiguous loan documents, and therefore all issues before this Court are subject to
de novo review under a correction-of-error standard without deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions. See Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 1992);
State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Russell v. Standard
Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995).
ISSUES
I.

Is the District Court divested of jurisdiction over a judgment made in

case while the judgment and the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals with respect
thereto are under appellate review by the Utah Supreme Court?
II.

Did the Judgment Creditor (i.e., Eugene Horbach — Appellant's

predecessor in interest) timely file his petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme
Court from the adverse decision of the Utah Court of Appeals which reversed the
Judgment of the District Court?

1

III.

Did the sending of the record on appeal by the clerk of the Utah Court of

Appeals to the District Court re-convey jurisdiction on the District Court and divest
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction even though the Utah Supreme Court
granted the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari, which resulted in the
affirmance of the District Court's Judgment, and a reversal of the Court of Appeals'
opinion?
IV.

Did the opinion of the Court of Appeals operate to vacate the District

Court's Judgment without further action by the District Court even though the opinion
remands the case to the District Court for further action?
V.

If this Court decides that the actions taken by the clerk of the Court of

Appeals operated to vacate the District Court's Judgment notwithstanding this Court's
timely decision to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals, did this Court's reversal
of the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirmance of the Judgment of the District
Court reinstate nunc pro tunc the District Court's Judgment against a third party who
took a security interest in the Judgment Debtor's property with notice that the
Judgment Creditor's Judgment was still of record and pending review by the Utah
Supreme Court?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
78-2-2. Supreme Court Jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
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interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;

]

(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of
Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), ( 4 ) & (5).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 provides that u[t]he Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . . . (i) cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court." {Id.)
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This Case involves a dispute between the Appellant, the successor in interest to
the Judgment Creditor, and the Appellees concerning their respective interests in real
property situated in Salt Lake County, Utah. Appellant sought to enforce its judgment
lien on the Judgment Debtor's real property by a writ of execution issued pursuant to
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Judgment Creditor's Judgment was
appealed by the Judgment Debtor. After ruling on part of the case, this Court
transferred appellate jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the remaining
part of the case. After reviewing the remainder of the case, the Utah Court of Appeals
made its written opinion which sought to reverse the District Court's Judgment. The
Judgment Creditor timely filed a petition for certiorari with this Court for review of the
Court of Appeals' opinion. This Court granted the Judgment Creditor's petition for
certiorari and upon review, reversed the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the
Judgment of the District Court in a published decision. Notwithstanding this Court's
decision, which affirmed the District Court's Judgment, District Court Judge Stephen
L. Henriod ruled that the Judgment is not enforceable against the Judgment Debtor's
property because the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was filed after the 30-
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day period for the filing of the petition and after the clerk of the Court of Appeals
remitted the record to the District Court. Based thereon, Judge Henriod declared that
Appellant's initial judgment lien was lost and permanently enjoined Appellant from
enforcing its Judgment against the subject property. Appellant contends that the
Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was timely filed within the 30-day period
because the 30th day fell on a Sunday, thereby extending the 30-day period to the
following Monday as provided by Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appellant also contends that the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is
established by statute — not by the actions of the clerk of the Court of Appeals, and
that the District Court was divested of jurisdiction over the Judgment made in the case
until the Supreme Court had concluded its review of the Judgment and the opinion of
the Court of Appeals.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court
A writ of execution was issued by the Third District Court pursuant to Rule 69
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to foreclose Appellant's judgment lien on a
parcel of property in Salt Lake County. A few days before the Sheriffs execution
sale, Appellees filed a separate action in the Third District Court (i.e., the present
action) wherein they asserted that the Court should enjoin the Sheriffs sale. On
November 19, 2001, Judge Henriod issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Sheriffs sale. Thereafter, Judge Henriod ruled that because the Judgment Creditor
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had not timely filed its petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court in the
underlying action, Appellant's judgment, which had been affirmed by the Utah
Supreme Court, was unenforceable. Appellant immediately moved to the District
Court to alter and amend its ruling because the certified docket of the Utah Supreme
Court reflects that the petition for certiorari, which was granted by the Utah Supreme
Court, was timely filed. Judge Henriod refused to grant Appellant's motion.
Thereafter, he made and entered a final judgment holding that Appellant's Judgment
and the lien which arose thereunder were not enforceable against the property. He also
permanently enjoined Appellant and the Sheriff from further execution on the
property. Appellant asserts that Judge Henriod5s memorandum decision is
inconsistent with the certified dockets of the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of
Appeals and the District Court. Appellant has filed this appeal seeking to have Judge
Henriod's final judgment reversed so Appellant and the Sheriff of Salt Lake County
may complete the execution sale of the subject property.
Statement of Facts
1.

Appellant's predecessor, Eugene Horbach (referred to herein as the

"Judgment Creditor"), obtained a money judgment (the "Judgment") against Lan C.
England, who is referred to herein as the "Judgment Debtor", in the matter of England
v. Horbach, Civil No. 930901471CV, reported at 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). The
Judgment Creditor's Judgment was thereafter assigned to Appellant.

6

2.

A copy of the Judgment, certified by the clerk of the District Court in the

matter of England v. Horbach, is attached as Exhibit G (4).
3.

A certified copy of the docket in the District Court for the

aforementioned case is attached as Addendum Exhibit G (1). A copy of the District
Court docket in the present case is attached as Exhibit A.
4.

It was undisputed that upon the signing and entry of the Judgment by the

District Court, a judgment lien arose on all non-exempt real property of the Judgment
Debtor located in Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, including
the property which is the subject of this action. (See Conclusions of Law, Exhibit N,
paragraphs 13-14)
5.

An appeal from the District Court's Judgment was taken to the Utah

Supreme Court. (Certified Docket of Supreme Court, Exhibit G (3), page 1.)
6.

After the Judgment Debtor's motion for summary disposition was denied

by this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. (See Court of Appeals
Docket, pages 1-2). A certified copy of the appellate docket from the Utah Court of
Appeals is attached hereto as Exhibit G (2).
7.

On October 19, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its written

opinion which states in relevant part as follows:
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and
satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we
All references to exhibits are to the Addendum Exhibits which have been submitted with
Appellant's brief.
7

conclude the agreement was not founded upon a mutual mistake of fact,
we reverse and remand for further action consistent with this
opinion.
England v. Horbach et al, 905 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (see Exhibit G (5), page
6) (emphasis added).
8.

On November 20, 1995, the Judgment Creditor (Appellant's

predecessor) filed a petition for certiorari with the clerk of the Utah Supreme Court
(Supreme Court Docket, Exhibit G (3), page 1), and on that same day the Utah
Supreme Court sent formal notice to the District Court giving notice that a petition for
a writ of certiorari had been filed. (Id.)
9.

The formal notice of the petition for certiorari that was given by the Utah

Supreme Court to the District Court was docketed on the District Court docket on
November 20, 1995. (Certified District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.) A
certified copy of the foregoing notice is attached as Appellant's Exhibit G (6).
10.

At the time the foregoing notice was given by the Utah Supreme Court

to the District Court, the "record on appeal" had not been remitted to the District Court
by the Utah Court of Appeals. (See District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.)
11.

At no time after the formal notice was given by the Utah Supreme Court

of the pending petition for certiorari, did the District Court vacate, alter or amend the
Judgment. (See District Docket, Exhibit G (1).)
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12,

On November 22, 1995, two days after the Utah Supreme Court gave

formal notice of the pending petition for certiorari, the cleii

-;\

- <.

. >i \

vnls

atten lpted to rei i lit tl le i ecoi d oi i appeal to tl ic District Com t. (See District Court
Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.)
13,

On February 14, 1996, the I Mah Supreme Court gave formal notice to the

[ )isli nl ( \nii1 111,11 11 h«nl tfnttth I.I" tin .lud;'t]ii nM 'ii ililni ^ pW i( m HI U n o i l 'h H Mh I .Si i'
District Court Docket, Exhibii G {[).) A certified copy of the foregoing notice is
attached as Exhibit G ( 7 )
1

- '-• •

: w as i e c o r d e d . am* • *

Debtor' rroneuy located in Salt Lake County, which is the subject of this action. A
copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit G (8).
15.
C u d i»

A> nivj iiiih. me loregoing det\; oi iri^t was recorder

MUIIU;;;

. • • • -:\-!v.'* . !.aini io review by the Utah Supreme

i.-i

Court were reflected on the District (\mi t *•-. docket {See District Court Docket,
Exhibit G ( l ) , page 18.)
16.

O

' -

-

*"•

'•-

:

••

•••

•

.

!

•

:

;

.

.-

England v. liorbach matter. A copy of the published onmion is attached as Exhibit G
(9). The decision of the Utah Supreme Court reversed ihe opu.ua: »»i \--, K - M
Ap

-e-i-

i

"

-

• •

')

•
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17.

On October 1, 1997, after all matters on appeal were concluded, the Utah

Supreme Court remitted the record on appeal to the clerk of the District Court. {See
Supreme Court Docket, Exhibit G (3), page 2; and District Court Docket, Exhibit G
(1), page 18.)
18.

A certified copy of the remittitur document from the Utah Supreme

Court to the District Court is attached as Exhibit G (10).
19.

Sometime in the year 2000, Scott Lundberg, as trustee, filed a notice of

default under the deed of trust. (Exhibit G (11), page 1.) Thereafter, a non-judicial
sale was conducted by the trustee whereat the trustee sold the subject property.
(Exhibit
20.

G (11), page 2.)
On December 28, 2000, Scott Lundberg executed a trustee's deed to the

buyer at the sale which was recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on
January 10, 2001. A copy of the deed is attached hereto as Exhibit G (11).
21.

The trustee's deed provides, in relevant part, as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited
and of the sum bid and paid by Grantee, by virtue of his authority under
the Trust Deed, grants and conveys to the Grantee, without any covenant
or warranty, express or implied, all of the property situated in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah . ..
(Exhibit G (11), page 2) (emphasis added).
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22.

On September 28, 2 0 0 1 , the Third District Court issued a writ of

execution to the Sheriff ol Sail i ake ( 'nun!. on Apfu ILIIITS liiilnnuMil
Docket, r

*

23.

11 )i >;lrn1 ('unit

>ugc- i y.)

On November 16, 2 0 0 1 , the Appellees filed their motion for temporary

restraining order {see Exhibit >\) and memorandum oi ,<• *\\. the". o \

(>'rr h *•

24.

:

\

On November 19, 2 0 0 1 , Appellant filed its memorandum in opposition

to the motion

\ copy of Appellant's m e m o r a n d u m in opposition u> i ^ nioi*« a i-

an iv iico a^ r. 25.

On November 19, 2 0 0 1 , Judge Henriod m a d e and entered his Temporary

Restraining Order. The Order restrained the Judgment Creditor and the Shen;: oi Salt
Lake Couni\ i;om proceeding \\ ill i I he execution s.ilc <»f the pioperlv
Teinp< -

^

\ t v p \ ^I'llir

; antlg Order is attached as Exhibit E. The Temporary Restraining

Order provided for a hearing on December 3, 2 0 0 1 .
26.

In compliance wiiii \Dc in:»iiuj!:--n

•

. r*!.^ •,* "' : i

si ibi i iitted a si ipplei i lei ital bi ief to the Court. Appellees' brief is attached as Exhibit F,
and Appellant's brief is attached as Exhibit G.
?~7.
- r- .».•

)ecember.:.
.

(

;.> ; .;.„:•;;•..

.. nca:ing was L

: .• .»

,\ii' p - - d e p u t e d facts at issue, the parties
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t

argued the legal issues before the Court. (See District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1),
page 2.)
28.

After argument, Judge Henriod took the matter under advisement. Judge

Henriod ordered that the Temporary Restraining Order would remain in effect pending
his decision. {See Case Docket, Exhibit A, page 2.)
29.

On December 10, 2001, the District Court issued its written

memorandum decision. A copy of the memorandum decision is attached as Exhibit H.
In its memorandum decision, the Court concluded, in relevant part, as follows:
In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on
November 22, 1995, more than thirty days after, the Court of Appeals
remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly thereafter, on
November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah
Supreme Court.
Based upon this sequence of events defendant contends that after
remittitur the District Court did not obtain proper jurisdiction and
consequently could [not] modify its judgment in accordance with the
instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for
certiorari was only granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back
to the District Court and after the thirty-day waiting period had expired.
Furthermore, as a matter of public policy. It was defendant who was in a
better position to protect itself in this matter since defendant could have
requested a stay of execution of judgment pending its petition.
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is
to be determined from the date of reinstatement and does not relate back
to the original judgment. Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah
1988).
Memorandum Decision, Exhibit H, page 2.
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30.

On January 7, 2002, Appellant filed its motion to alter and amend the

Court's memorandum decision. ^ mp* ^'

• *' .\< i

"*

i i lotioi i was si ippoi ted b> a niei norandui i i of points and authorities, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit J.
31

In its motion to amend, Appellant asserted inai h,c ceriiiied copu^ o- me

dockrls i if (In; 1 llah Si i pi a in' I 'niiil I In I 'tali ( 'HIII I * .1 \ppc,il . ,h J l\\r 1 )istnrl I <mi I
(which were all submitted and received by the Court at the hearing), established that
the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was filed timely with the clerk of the
Suprei l le Com 11 *ej or < • " tl :t.e attei i lpted i en littit i n of the re :oi d to the Disti ict Coi irt b y
the clerk of the Court ol Appeals, and before the 30-day period for the filing of
petitions of certiorari h a d expired. (See Exhibit J, pages 7-14.) Appellant also pointed
out that iiu i <v\ aecisum rehed ,.; * .. ; . \\u ; >i u\. . •
and

'

.•;.." i:>

•

.^/r:--•:•. t>i me banicjJ:

.. i p ; . sd to a i lew ji idgn lent
'Hem on appeal b y the

Supreme Court. {Id.) Appellant further indicated thai the certified docket of this
Court and the undisputed loai I documents conclusively establish tl lat the security
interest given b> tl le Ii idgi nei it Debtor to tl i, t tl in d part) lender occi irred after tl lis
Court had granted the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari a n d after this Court
recorded its notice thereof \\ im \\w \ u^wwx x \mv\

3

;

/</

On or about January 7, 2002, Appellees filed their memorandum in opposition thereto. A
copy of the opposition memorandum is attached as Exhibit L.
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32.

Because the foregoing facts appeared clear from the certified dockets,

Appellant sought leave to submit a proposed Declaratory Judgment to the Court. A
copy of Appellant's motion and the attached [proposed] Declaratory Judgment are
attached as Exhibit K.
33.

On January 30, 2001, the parties prepared and submitted a "Joint Notice

to Submit and Request for Ruling and Entry of Final Judgment". A copy of the
foregoing notice is attached as Exhibit M.
34.

On January 31, 2002, Judge Henriod signed the Final Judgment which

was submitted by Appellees. A copy of the Final Judgment is attached as Exhibit O.
Judge Henriod also signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by
the Appellees. A copy of the findings and conclusions is attached as Exhibit N.
35.

On March 1, 2002, Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal of the District

Court's Final Judgment, its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and the denial of
Appellant's motion to alter and amend. A copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal is
attached as Exhibit P.
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENTS
I.

The law is well settled that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction while a

judgment is under advisement on appeal. As such, the Judgment Creditor's Judgment,
which remained intact on the judgment docket, remained a valid judgment throughout
the appellate process because the District Court never regained jurisdiction over the

14

Judgment until the appellate review of the Judgment had been completed by the Utah
Supreme (\«iirr.
II.

The cei tified docket of the Utah Supreme Court reflects that the

Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was timely filed. Rule 22 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure clearly provider thai vviien ttk uisi ua\ ^; AW ming period falls
U:H

, . : i -: .

.

}

t \!: M.1. : '• -i

!

«h iiie l u i l o w i n g

Monday. As such, the conclusion by the District Court that the petition for certiorari
was not timely filed was clearly error.
III.

h

.!;*..

••:. •

'

'•"''"''

•' '

'Mil u as ItmHv lllrd

and because the petition was granted by this Court, jurisdiction over the Judgment
remained with this Court until it remitted the matter back to the District Court,
r

J .s, ^ i ourt granted tl le Ii idgn lei it Ci editc i 5s petitioi i for cei tiorai i loi ig

IV.
W^ >' "

]

.

%

' ) -btor encumbered his property by granting a deed of trust

thereon. Ilie certified dockets of the Supreme Court and the District Court
conclusively cstai:ii ... . ... . .
on (Vbi 11,11 *' I • i ,H)(i

..i<iment Creditor's petition u „TtiiM„.i \W -, . ? -.

I he 1 I,S!I n1 (.'our t docket also reflects that the Supreme Court

gave formal noti.ee of the writ of certiorari to the District Coin: t and that the notice was
entered on the I ii>tnci v. ouu s docket rn I aniiau . ,

•••-

:... . ,: . . _i; t i *. nu .

Deed of: I t i ist < \ as execi ited c i 1I\ la,;; - 2 1 1996 ai id recoi ded oi i May 31, 1996
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V.

The mere fact that the clerk of the Court of Appeals may have

prematurely remitted the record to the District Court did not operate to convey
jurisdiction on the District Court over the Judgment before the Supreme Court
completed its review thereof as concluded by the District Court. Indeed, Rule 1(d) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Appellate
Procedure may not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
VI.

The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals did not indicate that it was self

executing without further action by the District Court. Rather, the opinion expressly
states that wCwe reverse and remand for further action consistent with this opinion". As
such, Appellees' argument that the opinion of the Court of Appeals was self-executing
is inconsistent with that Court's ruling. Appropriately, Judge Frederick, (who was the
Judge in the action in which the Judgement was entered,) took no further action on the
Judgment until this Court had completed its review of the Judgment on appeal.
VII.

In the alternative, even if the Judgment Creditor's Judgment was vacated

by the decision of the Court of Appeals, this Court affirmance of the Judgment caused
the Judgment to be reinstated nunc pro tunc, which gave the Judgment Creditor's
judgment lien priority over the security interest taken by the third party which had
constructive notice that the Judgment Creditor's Judgment remained unaltered by the
District Court, and that the Judgment was under review by the Supreme Court.

16

ARGUMEN I '
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
WAS BASED UPON A CLEARLY E R R O N E O l
READING OF THE CERTIFIED COIJRT D O C K ^ ' S
In its memorandum decision, dated December lu, 2U01, tlle District Court
concluded as follows:
In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on
November 22, 1995, more than thirty days after, the Court of Appeals
remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly thereafter, on
November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah
Supreme Court.
Based upon this sequence of events defendant contends thai .
remittitur the District Court did not obtain proper jurisdiction and
consequently could [not] modify its judgment in accordance with the
instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for
certiorari was only granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back
to the District Court and after the thirty-day waiting period had expired .

M e i i i o r a i i d i 11 i i D e • : i s i o i i, E x 1 i i b i 11 1, p a g e 2
The District Court's m e m o r a n d u m decision was based upon the erroneous fact
that me Judgment Creditor's petition iui \WA O: certiorari was not. tin^-.. I-..*;;; ^ ;i:i
this Coi n t I low ever, the cei tified docket oft! le I Itah Si lpreme Coi n: IL, \ I licl i 1 * - as
received at the hearing as Appellant's Exhibit G (3), coiiclusively reflects that the
Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was indeed timely filed.
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Pursuant to Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] petition for
a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days
after the entry of the final decision by the Court of Appeals." Id,
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the manner in
which the 30-day period is to be calculated. The Rule provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed
by these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default which the designated period of time
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which
event the period extends until the end of the next day that is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday.
Utah R. App. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). Based upon the foregoing, when the last day
for the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari falls on a Sunday, the last day of the
thirty-day period shifts to the following Monday.
In the instant case, the 30 n day for the filing of the Judgment Creditor's petition
for certiorari was November 19th. However, because that day was a Sunday, the last
day of the 30-day period was Monday, November 20 n . The certified docket of the
Utah Supreme Court reflects that the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was
indeed filed on November 20, 2001. {See Appellant's Exhibit G (3).) Based upon the
foregoing, the petition for certiorari was timely filed within the 30-day period and the
District Court's ruling was clear error.
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The certified copy of the Supreme Court's docket reflects that the Supreme
Court gi ai ited tl le Ji idgi i lent Ci editor's petitioi i foi *rt it :»f cer tiorari on I 'ebi i lai y 13,
1996, ( S u p r e m e Court Docket, Exhibit G (3) at 1.) ! h e docket of the District Court
also reflects that a formal written notice w a s given to the District Court that the
petition

* ,r

.,•

. . *

:

i..i.;* ,

•

" • "'

*"\

(See District Court Docket at 18). A certified v^p\ o£ Llic notice was received at
hearing by the Court as Appellant's Exhibit G (7).
POINT II
THE DIS I RICT C O U R T ' S J INDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE ALSO ERRONEOUS
The District Court's conclusions of law are also in error for the following
additional reasons.
First, in I"1"1 <"\ l^'nlr ^o nl Hit" / /»//,) Rul(]\ o/ 'tppi'l/iffc /'i' tn 't'rfw'i slatnl iiiii
relevant part, that in the Court of Appeals, "[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari".
/

< -

,

•

,

• •

•

•

* •

f

certiorari is indeed granted, the record on appeal would be remitted to the Supreme
Court. However, if no petition for certiorari were filed or granted, then the record
would be ien11Ited h• Ih ' Jr.trii M 'nnl

hi ' irl Kule

reflect the state of the law:
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(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ
of certiorari. If a petition for writ of certiorari is timely filed, issuance of
the remittitur by the Court of Appeals will automatically be stayed until
the Supreme Court's disposition on the petition for writ of certiorari. If
the Supreme Court denies the petition, the Court of Appeals shall issue
its remittitur five days after entry of the order denying the petition. If the
supreme Court grants the petition, jurisdiction of the appeal shall be
transferred to the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals shall close
its file and transfer the record on appeal, if any, to the Supreme Court
Utah R. App. P. 36(2). The foregoing Rule conforms with case law that the District
Court is divested of jurisdiction until the entire appeal process has been concluded.
See Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d
305 (Utah 1996); Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990) ("This
court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction
over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.") As such, the District Court's
conclusion that somehow the Judgment was effectively vacated because the record on
appeal was inadvertently transferred by the clerk of the Court of Appeals to the
District Court is contrary to law.
Second, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provides that the
Rules of Appellate Procedure may not be constmed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. The rules provides that "[tjhese rules shall not be
constructed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of
appeals as established by law" (emphasis added). Utah R. App P. 1(d). As stated,
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Utah law provides that the District Court remains divested of Jurisdiction over a
judgment until the entire appeal process is completed.
Third, concerning the stay of execution, England was the Judgment Debtor, not
Appellant. As such, the Judgment Debtor was the party who would have sought a stay
of execution at the trial level. Moreover, because the opinion of the Court of Appeals
was remanding the case to the District Court so the Judgment could be vacated, there
was no reason for the Judgment Debtor to obtain further stay. Appellant did not need
to obtain a stay of its own Judgment, nor a stay of the opinion of the Court of Appeals
because the opinion did not become operative until the case was remanded to the
District Court and the Judgment vacated. However, as stated, the District Court was
divested of jurisdiction over the Judgment until the Supreme Court had concluded its
review of the Judgment.
Fourth, a judgment lien arises by operation of law upon the entry of the
Judgment, not by way of execution. Thus, a stay of execution would have no effect
the creation of a Judgment lien which arises automatically by operation of law.
POINT III
THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
WAS GRANTED LONG BEFORE THE DEED OF TRUST WAS
RECORDED AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S PROPERTY
The suggestion that Appellant was in a better position to protect itself because
the loan against the property (which was eventually foreclosed) was made before the
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Supreme Court granted its petition for certiorari is erroneous. The certified dockets of
the Supreme Court and the District Court establish conclusively that the Judgment
Creditor's petition for certiorari was granted on February 13, 1996. The District Court
docket also reflects that formal notice of the writ of certiorari was given by the
Supreme Court to the District Court and that the notice was entered on the District
Court's docket on February 21, 1996. {See District Court Docket, (Exhibit G (1), page
18.) However, the loan transaction on the property did not occur until May 24, 1996!
{See Appellant's Exhibit G (8)). As such, Appellees and their predecessors took the
property subject to the Appellant potential lien against the subject property.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT LIEN HAS PRIORITY
OVER APPELLEES 5 INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
SUB-POINT A
THE ISSUE IN THIS ACTION DOES NOT INVOLVE A RENEWAL JUDGMENT
BUT A JUDGMENT THAT WAS AFFIRMED AND REINSTATED ON APPEAL
In the second to last paragraph of its Memorandum Decision, the District Court
states as follows:
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is
to be determined from the date of reinstatement and does not relate back
to the original judgment. Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah
1988).

4

At no time have Appellees argued or established that they were good faith purchasers for
value.
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Memorandum Decision at 2. The same conclusion is stated in paragraph 15 of the
District Court's conclusions of law (see Exhibit O). A review of the Cox decision
reflects that it is not applicable to instant case because the discussion in Cox involved
the effect of a renewed or renewal judgment. A renewal judgment is a new judgment
obtained in a new action when an aging judgment is sued upon. Indeed, this is the
procedure by which judgments are renewed in this State.
In Cox, a lien creditor attempted to renew his judgment lien after the debtor's
bankruptcy case had discharged the debtor from personal liability on an aging
judgment. In Cox, this Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that "since the
bankruptcy discharged respondents' [the debtor's] personal liability on the judgment. .
. neither the judgment nor the judgment lien could be renewed." Id. at 939 (emphasis
added). The court made this conclusion because a "renewal judgment results in a new
judgment" {Id.) and the creation of a new judgment requires that personal liability
exist. Accordingly, when an action is filed to obtain a renewal judgment, that action
results in a new judgment being entered in a new docket. Thus, this Court has held
that the lien created by a renewal judgment will attach only from the date of its entry.
Id. The instant action does not involve a renewed or renewal judgment but rather a
judgment that was affirmed and reinstated by this Court on appeal.

23

SUB-POINT B
THE JUDGMENT REMAINED
VALID THROUGH THE APPELLATE PROCESS
The Judgment made in favor of the Judgment Creditor in the case remained
valid through the appeal process because the District Court never regained subject
matter jurisdiction over the Judgment to alter or vacate it.5 The remittitur of the record
does not control appellate Jurisdiction but rather appellate jurisdiction controls
remittitur. For example, in Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills
Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), this Court stated:
The Court of Appeals erred in remitting the case before the time to seek
certiorari had expired under the rules and erred again when it refused to
recall its erroneously issued remittitur. The judgment of the district
court is void because that court had no jurisdiction to enter a
judgment while the case was still pending in the appellate courts.
The district court judgment is vacated as void.
Id., at 307 (emphasis added). Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah
1990) ("This court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of
jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.")

5

The decision of the Court of Appeals is clear that the case was to be remanded with further
action by the trial court (i.e., the vacation of the Judgment).
6
If this were not the case and the clerk of the Court of Appeals could control jurisdiction of
this Court, then the clerk would be liable to Appellant for all damages which it will sustain as
a result of the improper remittitur of the appellate record to the District Court. Obviously, this
has never been the law.
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SUB-POINT C
EVEN HAD THE JUDGMENT BEEN VACATED (WHICH IT WASN'T),
THE JUDGMENT WAS REINSTATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
When a judgment is "reinstated7" as opposed to being renewed, this Court has
indicated that the original judgment should be revitalized and have the same force and
effect as though the judgment were never set aside. See Hewitt v. General Tire and
Rubber Co., 302 P.2d 712 (Utah 1956). In Hewitt, the jury had returned a verdict in
favor of the appellant and on the following day, the clerk signed and entered a
judgment on the jury verdict. Id. at 712. Thereafter, the trial court granted a motion
for a directed verdict and set aside the jury verdict and entered a judgment in favor of
the respondent. Id. Upon appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the judgment was
reversed, and this Court ordered that the judgment of the trial court be set aside, and
that the jury verdict be reinstated. Id. However, when the case was remanded to the
trial court so that the judgment could be reinstated in favor of the appellant, the trial
court only permitted interest on the judgment to accrue from the date this Court
ordered the judgment reinstated, as opposed to the date that the original judgment on
the jury verdict was entered. Id. As a result, the case went back to this Court on
appeal wherein this Court held that the trial court had erred in permitting interest to
accrue only from the date on which the order had been entered for the judgment to be
reinstated. Id. at 713. In reaching this conclusion, this stated as follows:
7

"Reinstate, To place again in a former state or position; to restore, the judge reinstated the
judgment that had been vacated." Black's Law Dictionary at 1290 (7th ed.) (emphasis added).
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The court's order entering judgment for the defendant was in error and
abortive, and when this court issued its mandate ordering the judgment
for defendant vacated and the judgment on the verdict for plaintiff
reinstated, it vitalized that judgment to the same extent and with the
same force as though the trial court had never entered the abortive
and erroneous judgment for defendant.
Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
This Court concluded that it could not see any good reason why the
appellant should lose the interest that had accrued on its judgment just because
the respondent had been able to convince the trial court to make an erroneous
ruling. Likewise, in this case, Appellant should not lose the priority of its
judgment lien, just because the Judgment Debtor was able to convince the
Court of Appeals to render an opinion which was rejected and reversed by this
Court.
SUB-POINT D
APPELLEES' PREDECESSOR TOOK THE
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE JUDGMENT
In its pleadings before the District Court, Appellees argue that the
original loan against the property was made before the Supreme Court granted
the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari. The argument had some
persuasion on the Court's decision. However, the certified docket of the
Supreme Court reflects that the Supreme Court granted certiorari on February
13, 1996 {see Supreme Court Docket at 2), and that a formal notice from the
Supreme Court to the District Court that the petition had been granted. The
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loan transaction on the property did not occur until May 24, 1996. {See
Appellant's Exhibit G (8)). Thus, when the loan transaction was made, the
o

lender knew that the loan might be subject to the Judgment. Indeed, at the
very least the Judgment gave notice of the pending action, i.e., a lis pendens
(Latin for "a pending law suit", Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.) at 942). As
such, any person searching title to the property had constructive notice of the
Judgment, that it was under review by the Supreme Court and that the Judgment
may be affirmed on appeal.
It is further compelling that Appellees obtained title to the subject
property through a trustee's deed, arising from a foreclosure sale, which
expressly stated that the property was being conveyed without any warranty on
December 28, 2000, several years after the Judgment had been reinstated by
this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the District Court's Final
Judgment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made in support thereof,
are based upon numerous conclusions which are clearly erroneous and contrary to law.
o

"From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed andfiledin the
office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the real
property of the judgment debtor, not except from execution, in the county in which the
judgment is entered . .." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1995) (while the statute was amended
in 1997, the foregoing remained the law for all judgments made before July 1, 1997). See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2) (2001).
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WHEREFORE, Appellant prays this honorable Court to reverse the Final
Judgment of the District Court and to make an order declaring that Appellant's
judgment lien against the subject property is indeed enforceable aad ordering further
that the injunction entered against Appellant and the Sheriff of Salt Lake County be
dissolved so the Sheriff may proceed with the execution sale of the subject property in
compliance with Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respectfully submitted this Q^t

day of March, 2001.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Steven W. Call
Attorneys for Appellant
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